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Goldstone Report and the call for accountability. – 4. Failure of the do-
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Court’s door. – 6. Recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
Abstract
The Israeli military operation against the Gaza Strip of 27 December 2008 – 18 January 
2009 (so-called Operation Cast Lead) started a critical debate at the international level on 
the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Gaza. In September 
2009 the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict presented its results: the Gold-
stone Report, named after the president of the mission, found that grave violations of in-
ternational law, humanitarian law and human rights had been committed by both sides 
of the conflict, but in particular by the Israeli side. The report also denounced the possible 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity and called for proper account-
ability mechanisms at the national and international level. The report’s conclusions and 
recommendations were endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council and by the General 
Assembly amidst high political pressure. In case of lack of proper domestic investigations 
and prosecutions, it was recommended the recourse to international justice mechanisms, 
and in particular to the ICC. The ICC Prosecutor in fact had opened a preliminary exami-
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nation of the situation, but difficulties arose because of the uncertain status of Palestine 
under international law. In the meanwhile, the principle of universal jurisdiction seems 
to represent the only available, although difficult, option in the search for justice and ac-
countability. The Gaza situation can be seen as a test case for international justice and 
sheds a light on the role of international institutions in the difficult mix of law and poli-
tics that is the feature of international justice.
Keywords
International Criminal Law - International Humanitarian Law - Interna-
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1 – General overview of Gaza situation
The Gaza Strip is part of the occupied Palestine territory and, according to the 
Oslo Accords1, forms a unitary territory with the West Bank. In fact, as a con-
sequence of Israeli long-standing policy, the West Bank and Gaza are nowadays 
two separated territories (almost impermeable for their respective residents that 
cannot move for one territory to the other). Gaza in particular has been subjected 
for many years to a persistent closure imposed by Israel, which controls all Strip’s 
border crossing (along with its sea and aerial space), with the exception of the 
southern border crossing with Egypt (Rafah). 
Over the course of the occupation the process of economic and political iso-
lation imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip was progressively reinforced. The 
closure policy was initially enacted on specific occasions as a form of collective 
punishment in response to attacks committed by Palestinians in Israel, or to po-
litical incidents. It involved the complete closing of all border crossings to both 
people and goods. These closures lasted for periods ranging from days, to weeks, 
or even months. This had a devastating impact given that the Palestinian econ-
omy had become increasingly dependent on Israel, which was a major source of 
employment, and the origin and destination of the majority of goods. Israel also 
imposed a dramatic reduction of the fishing zone (from the original 20, to 12, to 
6, to the current 3 nautical miles) and a ‘buffer zone’ all along the Strip’s borders, 
which considerably reduces the land available for agriculture and industry (up to 
35% of Gaza’s agricultural land are off limits, according to UN sources). Both the 
naval and the land restrictions are implemented through the recourse to live fire, 
which often results in civilian causalities.
1 The “Oslo Accords”, which were eventually signed in Washington, consisted of two parts, both 
of which were in fact the product of secret negotiations in the Norwegian capital: the Declara-
tion of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed on 13 September 1993 be-
tween the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); the Israeli-Palestinian 
Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed on 28 September 1995.
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The current total closure of Gaza has been imposed continuously since June 
2007, after Hamas takeover. The closure (called siege by the Palestinians) not only 
prevents Gazans from leaving the territory or exporting anything to the outside 
world, but also prevents the import of most of the goods, comprised the primary 
necessity ones. It basically only permits the import of a narrowly-restricted num-
ber of humanitarian goods. Since September 2007, when it officially declared 
Gaza a ‘hostile entity’, Israel has also reduced the supply of fuel and electricity, 
which made the Gaza power plant run out of fuel. The effects of the power cuts 
have been disastrous, in particular on hospitals. In general the closure of Gaza 
has devastating socio-economic effects and has resulted in the emergence of a 
humanitarian crisis. The entire 1,7 million population of the Gaza Strip has been 
forced to survive thanks to an underground economy, dependent upon a system 
of tunnels along the Egyptian border. The tunnels are the only remaining means 
of survival, everything comes through them, and without them life in Gaza 
would be simply unimaginable.
The closure is a violation of numerous international human rights and hu-
manitarian law principles; it infringes upon a number of fundamental human 
rights starting from the right to freedom of movement to the right to life. The 
closure indiscriminately affects the Gaza’s civilian population; indeed it consti-
tutes a form of collective punishment in violation, inter alia, of article 33 of the 4th 
Geneva Convention2. The Goldstone Report (see infra) concluded that this policy 
of closure might well amount to the crime against humanity of persecution. 
2 – Operation Cast Lead
It is in this framework that Israel decided to conduct the military offensive on the 
Gaza Strip (the so-called operation Cast Lead), which lasted for three weeks, from 
27 December 2008 until 18 January 2009. Israel’s announced objective was to re-
spond to the threat represented by the launching of rockets from the Gaza Strip 
and to defeat Hamas. Since 2001 Palestinian armed groups had launched about 
8000 rockets and mortars into southern Israel, which caused injures to civilians, 
damaged houses, schools and cars. 
However, the way the Israeli operation was conducted sparked immediately 
a wave of criticism within the international community, in particular for the ex-
tensive destruction inflicted on the Palestinian civilian population. In order to 
grasp the dimension of the attack’s lethal effects, it is worth recalling that more 
than 1,400 individuals were killed, and over 5,300 injured, many of them very se-
2 According to Article 33 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949: “No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she 
has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation 
or of terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and 
their property are prohibited.”
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riously, as a direct result of the attacks. It is estimated that the overwhelming ma-
jority of the casualties were civilians not taking part in hostilities, among which 
326 were children and 111 were women. The civilian infrastructure of Gaza was 
also subject to extensive destruction and damage: 2,864 housing units were com-
pletely destroyed and 5,014 rendered uninhabitable, displacing approximately 
50,000 individuals. Hospitals, schools, mosques, and factories were also targeted 
and in some cases destroyed beyond repair.
As for the losses on the other side, 9 Israeli soldiers were killed during the 
combat operations inside Gaza, 4 of whom from friendly fire. Moreover, 4 per-
sons were killed in southern Israel by rockets launched from Gaza, among whom 
one soldier and 3 civilians.
Numerous investigations and reports by national and international inde-
pendent human rights organizations, as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, B’Tselem, PCHR, the Arab League Report, provided compelling evidence 
indicating grave violations of international law by both sides, but in particular, 
by the Israeli armed forces (IDF). The tactics used by the IDF were consistent with 
previous practices, used most recently during the Lebanon war in 2006. A con-
cept known as the Dahiya doctrine emerged then, involving the application of dis-
proportionate force and the causing of great damage and destruction to civilian 
property and infrastructure and suffering of civilian population. Statements is-
sued by Israeli representatives as “destroy 100 homes for every rocket fired” indi-
cated the possibility that Israel was resorting to reprisal against civilians, which 
is prohibited under international law.
3 – The Goldstone Report and the call for accountability 
Given the seriousness of the allegations, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (FFM) with 
the mandate to “investigate all violations of international law and international 
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context 
of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 
27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during and after”. The 
FFM was led by the South African Judge Richard Goldstone, and composed by 
other three well-respected experts in international humanitarian, human rights 
and military law. The mission interpreted its mandate as requiring it to place 
the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the 
violations of international law. The normative framework adopted was general 
international law, international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law and international criminal law.
The FFM based its work on independent and impartial analysis and on inclu-
sive approach to gathering information: the mission reviewed 300 reports from 
different sources; conducted 188 individual interview with victims and witness-
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es and several site visits; analysed 30 video 1200 photos and satellite imagery, 
medical reports, forensic analysis of weapons and ammunitions; held public 
hearings. However, the FFM did not obtain the cooperation of the government 
of Israel and it only managed to enter Gaza from the Rafah crossing with Egypt. 
Since the mission was prevented to enter Israel and thus also the West Bank, it 
had to hold meetings with the Palestinians in Amman. The refusal by the Israeli 
authorities also prevented the mission to meet with victims in Israel and in the 
West Bank; public hearings were thus broadcasted live, to enable the victims to 
speak directly to the FFM. The mission also submitted comprehensive lists of 
questions to government of Israel, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank 
and to the Gaza authorities, but no replies were provided by Israel. 
The ‘Goldstone Report’3 – a detailed and very accurate document (which 
amounts to almost 600 pages) - was issued on 25 September 2009. The mission 
concluded that there are serious indications that war crimes and crimes against 
humanity have been committed by the Israeli forces and, on a different scale, by 
Palestinian armed groups. On the one side, the Mission found that the Palestin-
ian rocket attacks constitute indiscriminate or deliberate attacks upon the civil-
ian population and may therefore amount to war crimes; it also highlighted the 
commission of human rights violations by the Palestinian factions in the course 
of the 2006-2007 intra-Palestinian violence. On the Israeli side, the mission de-
nounced the disregard of the fundamental principles of necessity, proportional-
ity and distinction. The mission investigated in particular 36 incidents, which 
occurred in Gaza and are only indicative of the overall offensive; the report in 
fact does not purport to be exhaustive in documenting the very high number of 
incidents that happened in the relevant period.
It is impossible to summarize such a long and detailed report in few sentenc-
es but in my view among the most important findings of the Goldstone Report, 
it can be recalled in particular that: 
–  “The Mission concludes that what occurred in just over three weeks at the 
end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009 was a deliberately disproportionate 
attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, 
radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide 
for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and 
vulnerability”; 
and that: 
–  “Whatever violations of international humanitarian and human rights 
law may have been committed, the systematic and deliberate nature of 
3 Report of the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 25 Sep-
tember 2009.
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the activities described in this report leave the Mission in no doubt that 
responsibility lies in the first place with those who designed, planned, or-
dered and oversaw the operations.”
The Mission, “in view of the gravity of the violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law and possible war crimes and crimes against human-
ity”, recommended that the UN HRC should request the UN Secretary General 
(SG) “to bring this report to the attention of the Security Council under Article 
99 of the UN Charter so that the Security Council may consider action according 
to the Mission’s relevant recommendations”; and that the UN HRC should for-
mally submit this report to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court” 
(Report, par. 1968). 
Indeed one the most significant achievements of the Goldstone Report lies 
in its final recommendations, which envisage concrete judicial responses to the 
allegations of war crimes and other violations of international law committed 
by the parties to the conflict. The FFM called for the criminal accountability of all 
those suspected of the commission of war crimes (and possible crimes against 
humanity). As the report concluded: “Investigations and, if appropriate, prosecu-
tions of those suspected of serious violations are necessary if respect for human 
rights and humanitarian law is to be ensured and to prevent the development of 
a climate of impunity”. In particular, the mission recommended the UN Security 
Council that in the absence of good-faith investigations that are independent 
and in conformity with international standards having been undertaken or be-
ing under way within six months of the date of the resolution by the appropriate 
authorities (both Israel and Gaza), the UN Security Council acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, refer the situation in Gaza to the Prosecutor of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court pursuant to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute4.
The Goldstone Report and its recommendations were endorsed by the UN 
HRC and by the UN General Assembly (GA). With resolution 64/10 dated 5 No-
vember 2009 and again with resolution 64/254 of 26 February 2010, the GA 
called both sides “to conduct investigations that are independent, credible and 
in conformity with international standards into the violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law reported by the Fact-
Finding Mission towards ensuring accountability and justice”. Notably such 
resolutions established a very precise time frame (3 months initially, further 
extended to 5 months more) in order for the domestic authorities to cope with 
4 Pursuant to Article 13 of the Rome Statute: “The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with re-
spect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A 
situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to 
the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which one or 
more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Secu-
rity Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or (c) The Prosecutor 
has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with article 15.”
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their obligation to conduct proper investigations. However, it can be anticipat-
ed that more than three years after the events no accountability or justice for the 
victims has been achieved.
4 – Failure of the domestic proceedings
It is a fact that neither the Palestinian authority not the Israeli government con-
ducted proper investigations pursuant to international law standards, as was 
requested by the UN. The HRC established an Independent Committee of Experts in 
international humanitarian and human rights law to monitor and assess any domestic, 
legal or other proceedings undertaken by both the government of Israel and the Palestinian 
side, “including the independence, effectiveness, genuiness of these investigations 
and their conformity with international standards” (HRC Resolution n. 13/9 of 25 
March 2012)5. The Committee of Experts (COE) was presided by the emeritus inter-
national law professor Tomuschat of the Humboldt University of Berlin, and pre-
sented its report on 27 September 2010 (a follow-up report was presented in March 
2011 under the presidency of the American judge McGowan Davis).
With regard to the Palestinian side, the COE’s report acknowledged that the 
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank established an ‘Independent Investiga-
tive Committee’, which had conducted “independent and impartial investiga-
tions in a comprehensive manner that squarely addressed the allegations in the 
FFM report”. However, it shall be noted that – as the European Court for Human 
Rights clarified - in order to be effective, investigations must be capable of lead-
ing to the identification and punishment of those responsible: this was certainly 
not the case with regard to the West Bank investigations. The Gaza authorities, 
although claiming that they had also established an ‘International Investigative 
Commission’, failed to submit any substantial result to the COE. Thus ultimately 
both the West Bank and the Gaza authorities failed to conduct any proper inves-
tigations on the alleged crimes committed by Palestinians.
It shall be further noted that according to the terms of the 1995 Israel-Pales-
tine Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) does not have jurisdiction over Israelis. This would 
explicitly remove Israeli citizens, and members of its armed forces, from the 
jurisdiction of the PNA; no Israeli may be brought before a Palestinian court. 
This restriction (although legally questionable in the light of the doubtful cur-
rent value of such Israel-Palestine interim agreements) effectively removes the 
Palestinian judicial system from the ambit of legal options available to Palestin-
ian victims of Israeli crimes. 
5 For all the documentation and follow-up to the “Goldstone process”, see meLoni, toGnoni (eds), 
Is there a Court for Gaza? A test bench for International Justice, T.M.C. Asser/Springer, The Hague, 2012.
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On the other hand, after reviewing Israel’s system of investigation and pros-
ecution of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law, in particu-
lar of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity, the COE stressed that: 
“the Mission found major structural flaws that, in its view, make the system in-
consistent with international standards.” In particular, 
Israel has not conducted investigations into decisions made at the highest levels about 
the design and implementation of the Gaza operations. A core allegation in the FFM 
report was that the systematic and deliberate nature of the destruction in Gaza left 
the Mission in no doubt that responsibility lies in the first place with those who designed, 
planned, ordered and oversaw the operations. Those alleged serious violations go beyond 
individual criminal responsibility at the level of combatants and even commanders, 
and include allegations aimed at decision makers higher up the chain of command.
(Par. 64 first COE Report) 
In other words, the Israeli system – as it relates to Palestinian victims of Israeli 
violations – does not meet necessary international standards with respect to the 
effective administration of justice. The Israeli authorities’ presumption that all 
Palestinians are ‘enemy aliens’ or ‘potential terrorists’ has evident implications 
regarding the impartiality of the judiciary, the presumption of innocence, and 
the right to a fair trial. The hierarchical nature of the military, the ineffective 
manner in which investigations are conducted, and the lack of civilian oversight 
– as epitomized by the wide margin of discretion awarded by the Israeli Supreme 
Court – all combine to fundamentally frustrate the pursuit of justice. 
The same conclusion was already contained in the Goldstone Report:
[…] there are serious doubts about the willingness of Israel to carry out genuine in-
vestigations in an impartial, independent, prompt and effective way as required by 
international law. [...] the Israeli system presents inherently discriminatory features 
that have proven to make the pursuit of justice for Palestinian victims very difficult 
(Par. 1832 Goldstone report).
Given the reality of the situation in the occupied Palestinian territory and 
Israel, and the inability or unwillingness of the respective national courts to 
conduct genuine investigations and prosecutions, the practical pursuit of ac-
countability necessarily has to focus on the triggering of international judicial 
mechanisms, and notably in the first place on the intervention of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.
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5 – Palestine knocking at the International Criminal Court’s door
The International Criminal Court (ICC)6 is the first supranational, permanent 
and independent criminal tribunal. It was established through a treaty – the 
Rome Statute of 1998 – which entered into force in July 2002. The Court has juris-
diction over genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed on 
the territory or by national of State parties (which are currently 121, but with no-
table absences, as the USA, Russia, China and India). The jurisdiction of the ICC 
is thus not universal, but rather bound to territorial or national links; the only 
exception to this jurisdictional limitation is represented by those cases which 
are referred to the Court by the Un Security Council. According to its Statute, the 
ICC Prosecutor can open an investigation on alleged crimes everywhere commit-
ted, and by any State national, if those crimes have been referred by resolution of 
the UN SC. The investigations before the Court can also be triggered by a State’s 
referral, or initiated proprio motu by the Prosecutor (but, in the last case, only after 
an authorization by the Pre-Trial Chamber).
A declaration under article 12(3) of the ICC Statute was lodged by the Palestin-
ian government, in the person of the Minister of Justice, back in January 2009. 
Article 12(3) of the Statute provides that a State, which is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, can accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis. The Palestinian dec-
laration was thus accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for the purpose of “iden-
tifying, prosecuting and judging the authors and accomplices of acts committed 
on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002.” 
Following this declaration the ICC Prosecutor opened a ‘preliminary examina-
tion’ of the situation in Palestine but the actual opening of an investigation was 
put on hold, allegedly due to the unclear jurisdiction of the Court on the facts at 
stake. In fact Israel is not a State Party of the Court and Palestine is currently not in 
a position to ratify the Statute either. However, whereas the statehood status of Pal-
estine remains uncertain for the purpose of international law generally speaking, 
a convincing argument had been made by eminent international law professors7, 
in favour of the Palestine’s declaration: according to a functional interpretation of 
the concept of statehood, thus for the sake of the jurisdiction of the Court only, a 
determination by the ICC that Palestine is a State that can be under the jurisdiction 
of the ICC would be valid and in line with the Statute’s requirements. 
6 All the documentation about the International Criminal Court can be found at: http://www.
icc-cpi.int/.
7 See for all, PeLLet, The Effects of Palestine´s Recognition of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdic-
tion, in meLoni, toGnoni (eds.), Is There a Court for Gaza, cited above, 409 ff. where he argues that 
the Court did not need to pronounce in theory on the issue whether “in absolute” Palestine is or 
not a State; rather the Court had just to acknowledge the for the purpose of the Rome Statute the 
Palestine’s declaration can have the effects to activate the jurisdiction of the Court. The paper 
was written as a legal opinion and submitted to the Court in 2009 co-signed by forty interna-
tional law professors/individual authorities.
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For more than three years the Prosecutor seemed to be actively dealing with 
the question of Palestine and encouraged scholars, NGO’s, victims legal repre-
sentatives to submit documentation to the Office for the purpose of the prelimi-
nary examination. However on 3 April 2012 a two-pages ambiguous ‘Update’ by 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) concluded that the Prosecutor had no authority 
to decide on the issue because “the Rome Statute provides no authority for the 
Office of the Prosecutor to adopt a method to define the term ‘State’”.
The Office has assessed that it is for the relevant bodies at the UN or the ICC 
Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination whether Palestine 
qualifies as a State for the purpose of the Rome Statute and thereby enabling the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court and that the ICC could potentially “consider 
allegations of crimes committed in Palestine, should competent organs of the 
United Nations or eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal is-
sue” regarding Palestine’s member status.
The 3 April 2012 OTP statement meant the closing of the preliminary exami-
nation: despite the deceptive title, it is in fact not a ‘update’ but a ‘decisions not to 
investigate’, pursuant to article 15 of the Statute. Following these two pages, after 
39 months, the situation Palestine disappeared indeed from the list of the prelimi-
nary examinations before the ICC.
Some substantial questions arise over the fairness of the procedure adopted 
by the then Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, in dealing with the Palestine situ-
ation. Certainly the OTP never affirmed that there was no reasonable basis for 
the investigation. In other words, the Prosecutor never alleged that the available 
information did not provide a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court had been committed in Gaza/Palestine (as he did, on 
the contrary, in the other 2 situations, Iraq and Venezuela, where it was decided 
not to open the investigation). Nor the decision was based on the (lack of) gravity 
of the crimes. Rather, the decision was presented as a problem of preconditions 
to the exercise of the jurisdiction, and in this sense as a mere procedural issue. 
However the procedural problem was based on a substantive issue, i.e. the in-
terpretation of the term ‘State’ for the purposes of the ICC jurisdiction, and in 
particular according to article 12(3) ICC Statute. Thus, the question is: if it was not 
for the Prosecutor to interpret the term ‘State’ for the purposes of the Statute, and 
therefore to decide on the admissibility of the declaration lodged by the Palestin-
ians, who is the competent organ in this regard? 
In the 3 April 2012 decision the Prosecutor alleged that it must be either for the 
UN Secretary General (SG) or the Assembly of the States Parties (ASP) to decide. 
It shall be noted, however, that delegating the decision to political bodies under-
mines the independence of the Court and that a judicial determination of the issue 
by the ICC judges would have been the best option. In this sense speak also the 
words of the Registrar of the Court, Silvana Arbia, who, when issuing receipt of the 
Palestinian declaration, on 23 January 2009, noted that a conclusive determination 
on its applicability would have to be made by the judges at an appropriate moment. 
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Therefore it is contended that the Prosecutor could and should have referred the 
question to the judges. Pursuant to article 19(3) of the Rome Statute: “[t]he Prosecu-
tor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question of jurisdiction or admis-
sibility”, a process that can only be commenced by the Prosecutor. 
In theory the ICC door is not completely closed: should Palestine get recogni-
tion at the international level the Court could definitely reconsider the opening 
of the investigation. It is certainly not easy to make any prediction on what will 
happen in this regard. Although Palestine has been recognised by 130 States, the 
status of Palestine at the UN level is still to be determined. However, regardless 
of how the Palestinian bid to the UN will end, it is surprising that the Prosecutor 
did not take into serious consideration the fact that Palestine has been already 
admitted by a UN agency, notably the UNESCO, which is one of the guidance cri-
teria used by the UN SG, in his role as the depositary of international treaties 
(upon which the Prosecutor relied), in managing the problem of the indetermi-
nacy of the question of statehood status. In this sense it has been maintained by 
authoritative scholars8 that the UNESCO acceptance would have been enough for 
the Prosecutor to accept Palestine’s article 12 ICC Statute declaration. 
6 – Recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction 
Given the impasse of the International Criminal Court on the issue, the only way 
that – although difficult - seems currently to be available for the Palestinians in 
order to pursue justice, is the recourse to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
The principle of universal jurisdiction is a longstanding component of in-
ternational law. This principle holds that international crimes – such as grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and torture (the so called ‘core crimes’) – are of such serious-
ness that they affect the international community as a whole. Universal jurisdic-
tion “means that there is no link of territoriality or nationality between the State 
and the conduct of the offender, nor is the State seeking to protect its security or 
credit. In other words, despite the lack of a direct link to the crime, third States’ 
national courts are granted jurisdiction over international crimes “on behalf” of 
the international community. Although the issue is still controversial, under the 
principle of absolute universal jurisdiction – which is recognised in some coun-
tries as for instance Germany, Swiss, or Chile – it is not even required that the 
8 See schaBas, Relevant Depositary Practice of the Secretary-General and its Bearing on Palestinian Ac-
cession to the Rome Statute, 3 November 2011, at http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com.
au/2011/11/relevant-depositary-practice-of.html. For a updated comprehensive analysis of the 




suspect be present in the state exercising jurisdiction in order to open the pro-
ceedings and take investigative measures9. 
In this regard the Goldstone Report recommended:
[…] that the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 should start criminal in-
vestigations in national courts, using universal jurisdiction, where there is sufficient 
evidence of the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
Where so warranted following investigation, alleged perpetrators should be arrested 
and prosecuted in accordance with internationally recognized standards of justice.
However, universal jurisdiction cases have given rise to significant political con-
troversy. Criminal proceedings based on the principle of universal jurisdiction 
go to the very heart of inter-States’ relationships because they typically involve 
the highest echelons of the political and military establishment – those ‘most 
responsible’ – of a foreign State. International crimes indeed, for their systematic 
or widespread character, are normally perpetrated with the support of the politi-
cal apparatus. 
Lawyers recurring to the principle of universal jurisdiction have thus been 
accused of manipulating international and criminal law principles for political 
purposes, and in some instances a court’s decision to affirm its competence on 
the basis of universal jurisdiction has led to an aggravation of inter-State tension. 
Such political tension and the consequent pressure exerted on the governmental 
authorities of the State exercising universal jurisdiction has sometimes resulted 
in drastic consequences, for example in the changing of national legislation in 
order to restrict the scope of universal jurisdiction. 
This was the case also with regard to the issuance in 2009 of an arrest warrant 
against former Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in the UK, for her responsi-
bility regarding the alleged crimes committed by Israeli forces during Operation 
Cast Lead. The claim was made that ideological or political goals were behind this 
move. However, as noted by Daniel Machover, a UK solicitor working on univer-
sal jurisdiction cases, “[t]here is not a single example of the current system in 
Britain failing to filter out cases that are an abuse of process.” 
To conclude, notwithstanding the obstacles to its full implementation, uni-
versal jurisdiction constitutes an integral and vital component of the interna-
tional legal order. In fact, recent case law shows that criminal complaints pre-
sented before the judicial authorities for third states have given rise to a number 
of successful prosecutions (in particular, but not limited to, regarding Rwandan 
cases). Pending universal ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, recourse to third States’ courts shall be seen as the best way to pursue ac-
countability and uphold victims’ legitimate rights. 
9 See macedo (ed), Universal Jurisdiction, National Courts and the Prosecution of serious crimes under 
International Law, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2006.
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In particular with regard to the Palestine situation, given the respective in-
ability and unwillingness of the Palestinian and Israeli courts, and the ICC’s de-
clared lack of jurisdiction, it is presented that universal jurisdiction is a practical 
and possible means of securing accountability, a precondition to any workable 
justice in the region. As concluded in the Goldstone Report:
The Mission is firmly convinced that justice and respect for the rule of law are the in-
dispensable basis for peace. The prolonged situation of impunity has created a justice 
crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory that warrants action.
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